Defense and foreign affairs covers the armed forces, alliances, diplomacy, foreign aid, arms sales, and sanctions: how the United States protects itself and pursues its interests abroad. It is the largest single category of federal discretionary spending, and the United States spent about $954 billion on its military in 2025 by the SIPRI measure, roughly a third of the world’s total.⁠10 This page explains what the public prioritizes, why it is hard to measure, the real tradeoffs, and the strongest arguments across perspectives; who decides and the evidence go deeper.

In plain words

Defense means the military. Foreign affairs means how the country deals with other countries: allies, rivals, trade, aid, and treaties.

Most people agree on the big goals. Keep the country safe. Prevent attacks. Avoid wars that do not need to be fought. The hard part is everything after that. How much money is enough? Which allies should the country defend? When should it use force, and who gets to decide?

These choices are made almost entirely at the national level. Some of the information is secret. And the results can take decades to show. That makes this subject very different from fixing a road in your town.

Defined terms

Defense and foreign affairs (as a subject). Public concern with national security, the armed forces, alliances, diplomacy, foreign assistance, and the use of economic tools such as sanctions and arms sales.

Military expenditure. Spending on armed forces and defense activities. Different organizations count it differently; SIPRI’s international measure differs from the U.S. Department of Defense budget, which differs again from the federal “national defense” budget function.

Deterrence. Preventing an attack by convincing a potential adversary that its costs would exceed its gains.

Alliance commitment. A promise to defend another country. NATO members describe Article 5 of the Washington Treaty as meaning “an attack on one is an attack on all”.⁠1

Foreign assistance. Economic, humanitarian, development, and security aid provided to other countries.

Use of force. Military action abroad, whether under a declaration of war, a statutory authorization, or claimed presidential authority.

What the public prioritizes

Defense and foreign affairs priorities are clearest on protection from direct threats. In Pew Research Center’s April 2024 survey of 3,600 adults, 73 percent called protecting the country from terrorist attacks a top foreign policy priority, 64 percent said keeping illegal drugs out of the country, 63 percent said preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and 53 percent said maintaining a U.S. military advantage over other countries. Dealing with global climate change was a top priority for 44 percent. About a quarter named reducing U.S. military commitments overseas, and about two in ten named promoting democracy abroad.⁠2

Views of alliances divide more by party. In a March 2026 Pew survey of 3,507 adults, 57 percent viewed NATO favorably (75 percent of Democrats and leaners, 42 percent of Republicans and leaners), and 59 percent said the United States benefits a great deal or a fair amount from NATO membership; among Republicans that share fell from 49 percent in 2025 to 38 percent.⁠3

Trust in the military stands apart from trust in government generally. Gallup’s June 2025 survey found 62 percent expressing a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the military, compared with about 10 percent for Congress.⁠4

Why it is hard to measure

Defense and foreign affairs priorities are hard to measure for reasons specific to the subject.

Goals are consensual; means are not. Nearly everyone wants to prevent attacks. A high ranking for “defense” can mean “spend more,” “spend smarter,” or “stop fighting other countries’ wars.” The same rank hides opposite demands.

Information is unequal. Threat assessments and operational details are often classified. Citizens are asked to weigh tradeoffs whose full evidence they cannot see, and officials can cite evidence the public cannot check.

Time horizons are long. A weapons program decided this year may not be fielded for a decade, and the F-35’s sustainment costs are estimated across the whole life of the fleet, which the services have extended (see evidence). Few priority surveys capture preferences about costs that fall on the next generation.

Events move opinion fast. Attacks, wars, and crises shift priorities sharply and temporarily. A measurement taken in the month after a crisis and one taken a year later may both be accurate and very different.

Counterfactuals are invisible. If deterrence works, nothing happens, and nothing is hard to credit. If restraint works, the war that did not happen is equally hard to see.

The real tradeoffs

Defense and foreign affairs involves tradeoffs that persist whatever the public’s priority ranking.

Defense spending versus everything else. Treasury’s public guide notes that Congress allocates “over half of the discretionary budget towards national defense”.⁠5 The Department of Defense’s fiscal 2027 request totals $1.45 trillion, including $350 billion in mandatory funding that assumes a future reconciliation bill, $440.9 billion (44 percent) above the fiscal 2026 enacted level of $1.01 trillion, according to the Congressional Research Service.⁠6 Every dollar of that request is weighed against taxes, deficits, and domestic programs. See tradeoffs.

American spending versus everyone else’s. By the SIPRI figures republished by the World Bank, U.S. military expenditure in 2025 was about $954 billion, or 3.1 percent of GDP, against a world total of about $2.86 trillion and a world average burden of 2.5 percent of GDP; China’s spending was about $336 billion (1.7 percent of GDP) and Russia’s about $190 billion (7.5 percent of GDP).⁠10 Those who favor higher spending point to Russia’s burden and China’s growth; those who favor lower spending point to the U.S. share of the world total. Both are reading the same table.

Deterrence versus provocation. Forces strong enough to deter may also look threatening to rivals and invite an arms race. Which effect dominates in a given case is a judgment, not a measurement.

Alliances versus burden sharing. Alliances add allies’ strength to deterrence but commit the United States to defend others. In June 2025, NATO members committed to invest 5 percent of GDP annually by 2035, at least 3.5 percent on core defense and up to 1.5 percent on related resilience and infrastructure,⁠1 a response in part to long-running U.S. complaints about unequal burdens.

Speed versus deliberation. Some threats require fast decisions; democratic legitimacy favors debate and congressional authorization. The War Powers Resolution is an attempt to balance the two (see who decides).

Values versus interests. Promoting democracy and human rights can conflict with cooperating with useful partners who share neither. Pew’s data show democracy promotion near the bottom of public priorities,⁠2 yet many people object when the United States aligns with abusive governments.

The strongest arguments across perspectives

Defense and foreign affairs debates are often described along four strands. None maps neatly onto one party.

Primacy or peace through strength. American military superiority deters rivals, protects trade routes, and keeps wars from starting. Weakness invites aggression, and the costs of deterrence are far smaller than the costs of a major war. Advocates point to the 53 percent of Americans who rank maintaining military advantage as a top priority,⁠2 and to rising spending by rivals.

Restraint. The United States is protected by oceans and a nuclear deterrent and has overextended itself in costly wars. Advocates cite estimates that the post-9/11 wars will cost on the order of $8 trillion including future veterans’ care (an estimate disputed in scope; see the evidence page) and argue that wealthy allies should defend themselves. Restraint advocates include people on both the left and the right.

Liberal internationalism. Alliances, institutions, trade, and diplomacy multiply American power at lower cost than military force alone. Foreign aid, about 1 percent of federal budget authority in fiscal 2019 by CRS’s count⁠7 buys influence and stability cheaply. Abandoning allies would invite rivals to fill the gap.

Fiscal discipline. Whatever the strategy, the defense budget should be accountable like any other. Advocates note that the Department of Defense has received a disclaimer of opinion on every full financial audit, eight in a row through fiscal 2025, and that GAO lists five Defense Department areas on its 2025 High-Risk List.⁠8,9 This view can support higher or lower spending; its demand is that money be traceable and well spent.

Evidence

Defense and foreign affairs figures on this page come from Pew and Gallup surveys with stated dates and samples, CRS analysis of the budget request, NATO’s official declaration, Treasury, GAO, and CRS reports on audits. The evidence page covers measurement disputes, including how to count the cost of wars and whether sanctions work.

Competing interpretations

Defense and foreign affairs evidence supports several readings.

  • High spending as necessary insurance. The United States spends more because it carries global commitments that protect trade and allies; comparisons with other countries miss what the spending buys.
  • High spending as inefficiency. Failed audits and cost growth show the budget is less disciplined than other spending, so more money does not mean more security.
  • Public opinion as a weak guide. Because information is classified and events move fast, some argue foreign policy should be left largely to elected leaders and professionals.
  • Public opinion as a needed check. Others argue that wars are paid for in citizens’ lives and taxes, and that wars launched without durable public support fail.

Application to this framework

Defense and foreign affairs shows how My Vote Forward’s three parts differ.

  • Priorities. A participant can rank defense and foreign affairs against other subjects. A published aggregate shows relative concern; it does not say whether people want more or less spending. See priorities.
  • Opinions. Specific, dated questions (for example, on a named alliance commitment or a spending level relative to a named baseline) are more informative, but they demand careful wording and context. See opinions and question design.
  • Voting. Voters do not vote directly on war, treaties, or the defense budget in the United States. Their official influence runs through elections for Congress and the presidency. See representation.

What My Vote Forward can and cannot do here

My Vote Forward can show how participants rank defense and foreign affairs against other subjects, explain which bodies decide which questions, and present sourced figures with their definitions.

It cannot:

  • assess threats, judge classified information, or tell anyone whether a military action is justified;
  • treat a priority ranking as a mandate for a spending level or a war;
  • conduct any official vote; the websites do not, and the demo uses simulated data;
  • produce representative national opinion, since its participants are self-selected (see measurement);
  • recommend parties or candidates on national security.

Unresolved questions

  • How should a priority tool handle subjects where the public’s information is necessarily incomplete?
  • Can a question about defense spending be asked fairly without first explaining which of several spending measures is meant?
  • Should priority data on foreign affairs be collected continuously, or would crisis-driven swings make continuous data misleading?
  • How should participants’ preferences about costs that fall on future generations be weighed?

Sources

  1. NATO, “The Hague Summit Declaration,” June 25, 2025. Jurisdiction: NATO member states. nato.int/… (accessed 2026-10-26).
  2. Pew Research Center, “What Are Americans’ Top Foreign Policy Priorities?” April 23, 2024 (survey April 1 to 7, 2024, 3,600 adults). Jurisdiction: United States. pewresearch.org/… (accessed 2026-10-26).
  3. Pew Research Center, “Republicans have become less likely to say NATO membership benefits the US,” April 6, 2026 (survey March 23 to 29, 2026, 3,507 adults). Jurisdiction: United States. pewresearch.org/… (accessed 2026-10-26).
  4. Gallup, “Democrats’ Confidence in U.S. Institutions Sinks to New Low,” July 2025 (survey June 2 to 26, 2025). Jurisdiction: United States. news.gallup.com/… (accessed 2026-10-26).
  5. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Fiscal Data, “Federal Spending,” America’s Finance Guide. Jurisdiction: United States. fiscaldata.treasury.gov/… (accessed 2026-10-26).
  6. Congressional Research Service, “FY2027 Defense Budget: Funding for Selected Weapon Systems,” R49023, updated September 3, 2026 (mirror of the CRS text). Jurisdiction: United States. everycrsreport.com/… (accessed 2026-10-26).
  7. Congressional Research Service, “Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy,” R40213, January 10, 2022. Jurisdiction: United States. everycrsreport.com/reports/R40213.html (accessed 2026-10-26).
  8. Congressional Research Service, “Defense Primer: FY2025 Department of Defense Audit Results,” IF12627, April 28, 2026. Jurisdiction: United States. everycrsreport.com/… (accessed 2026-10-26).
  9. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “High-Risk List,” 2025 update. Jurisdiction: United States. gao.gov/high-risk-list (accessed 2026-10-26).
  10. World Bank, World Development Indicators, “Military expenditure (current US$)” (MS.MIL.XPND.CD) and “Military expenditure (% of GDP)” (MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS), source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2025 values, data last updated 2026-10-08. Jurisdiction: international. data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS and api.worldbank.org/… (accessed 2026-10-26).