California’s statewide initiative process

California’s statewide initiative process lets voters propose and enact statutes and constitutional amendments: between 1912 and July 1, 2025, 2,152 initiatives were titled and summarized for circulation, 401 qualified for the ballot, and 140 of the 396 placed before voters were approved, according to the Secretary of State. Approved initiatives include Proposition 13 (1978, property taxes), Proposition 187 (1994, public services for unauthorized immigrants, largely blocked in court), Proposition 209 (1996, preferential treatment), Proposition 8 (2008, marriage) and Proposition 22 (2020, app-based drivers). The process is the most-studied American example of direct lawmaking and is criticized from left and right for different reasons.

In California, voters can write a law, gather enough signatures, and put it on the statewide ballot. If most voters say yes, it becomes law without the Legislature voting on it. Most attempts never collect enough signatures, and most measures that reach the ballot lose. But some of the state’s biggest decisions came this way. Once passed, these laws can be hard to change, and courts have struck down or limited some of them. Large amounts of money are often spent on both sides.

This page focuses on outcomes and controversies. The mechanics of qualifying an initiative, including title and summary, fiscal estimate, signature thresholds and the legislative hearing, are covered in proposals and participation over time, and the budget constraints voters have created are discussed in tradeoffs. For an international comparison, see Switzerland’s direct democracy.

Defined terms

California’s initiative system uses several terms with specific meanings.

• Initiative statute and initiative constitutional amendment: voter-proposed changes to state law or to the state constitution. For 2026 the Secretary of State lists signature requirements of 546,651 and 874,641 respectively.⁠²
• Direct and indirect initiatives: a direct initiative goes to voters once it qualifies; an indirect initiative is first submitted to the Legislature. Of the 2,152 initiatives titled since 1912, 2,133 were direct and 19 indirect.⁠¹
• Title and summary: the official description prepared before circulation; see proposals.
• Proponent: the person or group that files and sponsors an initiative. Proponents’ legal role after enactment was central in Hollingsworth v. Perry.⁠⁵
• Voter-approval lock: under article II, section 10(c) of the California Constitution, as described by the California Supreme Court, the Legislature may amend a voter-approved statute only with voter approval unless the initiative itself permits otherwise.⁠⁶
• Severability clause: a provision saying that if part of a measure is struck down, the rest survives.⁠⁶

What happened

California’s initiative record can be summarized from the Secretary of State’s own data and from landmark measures.

Volume and success, 1912 to July 1, 2025:⁠¹

Of the 140 approved, 40 were constitutional amendments, 86 statutes, and 14 both.⁠¹ One indirect initiative was adopted by the Legislature.⁠¹

Selected landmark measures, with approval shares from the Secretary of State:⁠^3,4

• Proposition 13 (1978), Property Tax Limitation: approved with 65%.
• Proposition 187 (1994), Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services: approved with 58.93%.
• Proposition 209 (1996), Prohibition Against Discrimination or Preferential Treatment: approved with 54.55%. In 2020, Proposition 16, “Affirmative Action in Government Decisions,” failed, 42.8% Yes to 57.2% No.⁠⁴
• Proposition 8 (2008), Eliminates Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry: approved with 52.30%.
• Proposition 22 (2020), App-Based Drivers and Employee Benefits: approved 9,958,425 to 7,027,820, 58.6%.⁠⁴
• Proposition 36 (2024), Felony Charges and Increased Sentences for Certain Drug and Theft Crimes: approved with 68.40%.⁠³

Timing. Ballot measures were first numbered in 1914; initiatives appeared only on general election ballots before 1960, on primary, general and special ballots from 1960 to mid-2011, and only on general election ballots since July 2011 under Senate Bill 202.⁠²

How it worked

California’s initiatives become law through voters, but courts, the Legislature and the measures’ own drafting shape what happens next.

Courts. Voter approval does not shield a measure from constitutional review. Proposition 187’s benefit restrictions were halted by a federal district court in December 1994; a November 1995 decision in LULAC v. Wilson continued the freeze and overturned most enforcement procedures; a permanent injunction followed in March 1998; and on September 13, 1999, a federal judge approved a mediated agreement, sought by newly elected Governor Gray Davis instead of an appeal, under which the parties agreed to maintain the injunction’s effects.⁠⁷

Who defends a measure. After a federal district court ruled against Proposition 8, state officials “elected not to appeal.” The U.S. Supreme Court held 5 to 4 in Hollingsworth v. Perry (June 26, 2013) that the initiative’s official proponents lacked standing to appeal, because, as private parties, they had no role in enforcing Proposition 8 and “standing in federal court is a question of federal law, not state law”.⁠⁵ In dissent, Justice Kennedy wrote that under California law “a proponent has the authority to appear in court and assert the State’s interest in defending an enacted initiative”.⁠⁵ The case showed that an initiative can be left without a defender in federal court when elected officials disagree with it.

Entrenchment. Initiatives can protect themselves from later change. Proposition 22 provides that the Legislature may amend it only by a seven-eighths vote of each house, only if the amendment “is consistent with, and furthers the purpose of” the measure, and declares that “Any statute that amends Section 7451 does not further the purposes of this chapter”.⁠⁶ On July 25, 2024, the California Supreme Court unanimously held in Castellanos v. State of California that the measure’s classification of app-based drivers as independent contractors does not conflict with the Legislature’s constitutional power over workers’ compensation.⁠⁶

Lasting fiscal effects. The Legislative Analyst’s Office explains that Proposition 13 limits a property’s overall tax rate to 1 percent, bases taxes on purchase price, limits annual growth in taxable value to 2 percent or inflation, and requires two-thirds voter approval for local special taxes.⁠⁸

Evidence: measured results

California’s initiative process has been measured in qualification rates, campaign spending, fiscal effects and comparative research.

Selection. About three of four titled initiatives never qualify, and about two of three qualified measures that reach voters are rejected.⁠¹ Any account of “what voters want” drawn from initiatives reflects what proponents could fund to the ballot, not a census of public priorities.

Spending. Ballotpedia reported that by September 4, 2020, the Yes on 22 campaign had received $181.4 million from five app-based companies and the No campaign $4.8 million, mostly from two unions, making it “the most expensive California ballot measure contest overall” at that point; the prior record was Proposition 87 at $150,770,683.⁠⁹ A 2023 law review note by Keith Osentoski puts total Proposition 22 spending above $224 million and spending on the twelve 2020 statewide measures above $785 million.⁠¹⁰

Fiscal effects of Proposition 13. The LAO found property tax payments “dropped by roughly 60 percent immediately following Proposition 13,” that total local government revenue per person (excluding state and federal funds) has since risen 36 percent, that city and county tax revenue per person has declined, that homeowners’ relief is “generally proportionate to the market value of their homes,” and that property turnover has slowed, with Proposition 13 “also” appearing “to have a role”.⁠⁸

Comparative research. John Matsusaka, reviewing the research literature in the Journal of Economic Perspectives (2005), concluded that the emerging evidence suggests letting the public vote directly on laws tends to improve government performance, summarized in his phrase “direct democracy works”.⁠¹¹ That is one scholar’s synthesis; others reach more critical conclusions, discussed below.

Failures and criticisms

California’s initiative process is criticized from several directions, and the critics often disagree with each other.

Money. Osentoski argues that spending has pulled direct democracy away from its Progressive Era purpose of limiting corporate influence, and that the statewide system has come to serve the interests it was meant to keep out, proposing contribution limits, higher signature thresholds, or limiting initiatives to local issues.⁠¹⁰ Defenders reply that heavy spending does not guarantee victory, and the Secretary of State’s data show most qualified measures lose.⁠¹ Both points can be true at once.

Minority rights. Critics argue that majorities have used initiatives to restrict the rights of minority groups, pointing to Propositions 187 and 8, both later blocked or left undefended in federal court.⁠^5,7 Supporters of those measures argued they reflected legitimate democratic choices on public benefits and on marriage, and that courts and officials overrode the voters. In Hollingsworth, the dissent made a version of that argument about officials declining to defend a voter-approved law.⁠⁵

Rigidity. Critics across the spectrum argue that voter-approved statutes and constitutional amendments lock in policy. Proposition 22’s seven-eighths rule.⁠⁶ and Proposition 13’s tax limits⁠⁸ are examples cited by people who want to change them; their supporters regard the same features as protection against legislative override.

Voter burden. Long ballots require voters to judge complex statutes. In 2020 the ballot carried at least twelve statewide measures⁠¹⁰ Some argue this rewards simple slogans; others argue voters use cues effectively.

Who overrides whom. Statewide votes such as the 2020 rejection of Proposition 16, on affirmative action in government decisions,⁠⁴ and the 2024 approval of Proposition 36, on drug and theft sentences,⁠³ are read in opposite ways. Supporters of direct democracy see voters correcting officials; critics see complex policy settled by campaign slogans.

Competing interpretations

Scholars and participants read California’s initiative history in at least three ways.

Direct democracy improves responsiveness. Matsusaka’s synthesis.⁠¹¹ supports this view: the threat and use of initiatives push policy toward what majorities want.

Direct democracy amplifies organized money. Osentoski’s note⁠¹⁰ and the spending records⁠⁹ support this view: the process is most accessible to those who can fund signature drives and campaigns.

Direct democracy is a constrained tool. On this reading, the process works within limits set by courts, entrenchment rules and voter skepticism, which is why most measures fail⁠¹ and why some that pass are modified or blocked⁠^5,7

What transferred and what did not

California’s model has influenced debates elsewhere, but its specific features vary across jurisdictions.

Transferred. Rules such as official fiscal estimates and single-subject limits, discussed with sources in proposals, appear in other initiative states as well.

Distinctive. California’s voter-approval lock on initiative statutes, and the ability of a measure such as Proposition 22 to set its own amendment threshold,⁠⁶ are defining features. How they compare in strength with other states was not verified for this page.

Not established here. Whether reforms such as the 2011 move to general election ballots.⁠² changed which measures pass was not established by sources verified for this page.

Application to this framework

California’s experience informs several parts of My Vote Forward.

• Agenda access is unequal. Only measures that can fund qualification reach voters⁠^1,9 The framework’s governance rules on who sets the agenda address that problem for priorities, not for ballots.
• A priority is not an initiative. Public priorities collected without signatures or spending are a different signal from a ballot measure; see collective priorities.
• Rights sit outside the priority list. The litigation over Propositions 187 and 8;⁠^5,7 illustrates the framework’s position that shared priorities do not decide individual rights; see representation.
• Show the lock-in. A proposal record should state whether a measure can later be amended and by whom, as Proposition 22 does⁠⁶ see proposals and tradeoffs.
• Separate funding from support. Reporting spending alongside results helps readers interpret outcomes; see published releases.

Unresolved questions

• How much does spending change outcomes, as opposed to following measures already likely to win or lose?
• Should voter-approved statutes become amendable by the Legislature after a set period?
• How should a state ensure that a voter-approved measure is defended in court when elected officials decline to do so?
• Do long ballots reduce the quality of voter decisions, and by how much?
• What would a fair cost of qualification be, and how would changing it alter who uses the process?