Taiwan’s referendums, 2018 to 2021: lower thresholds, crowded ballots, and a calendar fight

Taiwan’s referendums from 2018 to 2021 followed a December 2017 overhaul of the Referendum Act that cut signature thresholds and set passage at a majority of valid votes with “yes” votes equal to at least one quarter of eligible voters.⁠^1,2 Ten national questions voted alongside the November 24, 2018 local elections produced seven approvals and hours-long polling delays; four questions voted on December 18, 2021, after a 2019 change separated referendums from elections, all failed, with turnout near 41 percent.⁠^3,4,5,6

In plain words

Taiwan lets citizens put questions to a national vote. For years the rules were so strict that hardly anything passed. In late 2017, lawmakers made it much easier: fewer signatures to start a question, and a simpler rule to pass one (more yes than no, and the yes votes must be at least a quarter of all eligible voters).

The next year, people put ten questions on the ballot, on the same day as local elections. Lines were so long that some people were still voting three hours after polls were supposed to close, and counting went on past 2 a.m. Several questions were about same-sex marriage, which Taiwan’s top court had already said must be allowed. Voters approved questions opposing the court’s approach, and the government then passed a separate law that still let same-sex couples marry.

Lawmakers then moved referendums to their own day, every two years. In 2021, four questions went to voters on a separate day. Fewer people voted and all four failed. Since then, the rules have been changed again. The fight over when and how to hold referendums is still going on.

Defined terms

• Referendum Act. Taiwan’s law governing national and local referendums, enacted December 31, 2003, rewritten in full January 3, 2018, amended in 2019 and again on December 3, 2025.⁠^1,7
• Approval quorum. A minimum share of all eligible voters who must vote “yes.” Taiwan’s rule: a proposal passes if valid “yes” votes exceed “no” votes and “yes” votes are “at least one-fourth of the total number of eligible voters”.⁠¹
• Proposal and joint signature stages. A national referendum needs proposers equal to at least one ten-thousandth of the electorate in the most recent presidential election, then joint signatures of at least 1.5 percent.⁠¹
• Excluded subjects. No referendum may be proposed on “budgeting, taxation, salaries, and personnel affairs”.⁠¹
• J.Y. Interpretation No. 748. The 2017 constitutional interpretation by Taiwan’s Grand Justices on same-sex marriage, which the Judicial Yuan’s leadership described in 2018 as having “equal legal weight as the Constitution”.⁠⁸
• Coupling. Holding referendums on the same day as general elections.

What happened

Taiwan’s 2017 amendments, passed December 12, 2017, lowered the referendum voting age from 20 to 18, cut the initiation and signature thresholds (which the Taipei Times reported as from about 90,000 to about 1,800 proposers and from about 900,000 to about 280,000 signatures), allowed online signature drives, and set passage at 25 percent of eligible voters voting “yes”.⁠² A KMT motion for a 20 percent threshold and a KMT absentee voting motion failed.⁠² The full revised act was promulgated on January 3, 2018.⁠⁷

In 2018, ten national referendum questions went on the ballot with the November 24 “nine-in-one” local elections.⁠^4,14 Seven passed.⁠⁴ The passage threshold was more than 4.94 million “yes” votes.⁠³ Five questions concerned same-sex marriage and gender education;⁠³ another, #16, asked whether to abolish the provision of the Electricity Act requiring nuclear plants to “wholly stop running by 2025,” and passed.⁠⁹ A proposal on the name used at international sporting events was defeated.⁠⁴

Polling day was overwhelmed. All 1,563 Taipei polling stations finished voting by 7:46 p.m. instead of the 4 p.m. close (voters in line by 4 p.m. could still vote), and the last station in the country finished counting at 2:39 a.m..⁠¹⁰ The Central Election Commission (CEC) chair said polling places had been fixed before extra referendums were added, and that of about 15,000 stations consulted, only 3,500 had room for additional voting screens; he resigned, saying “As the senior official, I must accept all responsibility”.⁠¹⁰

In June 2019, the legislature separated referendums from elections: referendums were to be held “on the fourth Saturday of August once every two years, starting in 2021”.⁠¹¹ The 2021 referendums, originally set for August 28, were postponed by the CEC to December 18 because of a nationwide level 3 COVID-19 alert, citing Article 24 of the Referendum Act and Constitutional Interpretation No. 553.⁠¹² On December 18, 2021, all four questions failed.⁠⁵

The rules moved again. On November 21, 2025, the legislature passed an amendment restoring same-day voting when a national election falls in the window,⁠¹¹ now in Article 23: the referendum is held “between three and six months after the announcement,” and if a nationwide election occurs in that period, “the referendum shall be held on the same day”.⁠¹ Between those changes, an August 23, 2025 referendum on restarting a nuclear plant drew 4,341,432 “yes” votes, about 73.5 percent of participating voters, but failed because the threshold was 5,000,523 and turnout was 29.53 percent.⁠¹³

How it worked

Taiwan’s national referendum process, as the current act describes it, has several stages:⁠¹

1. Proposal. A single lead proposer files a proposal whose main text is limited to 100 words and must be “concise, clear, and objectively neutral,” with a statement of reasons up to 2,000 words, plus proposers equal to at least one ten-thousandth of the last presidential electorate.
2. Review. The CEC may order corrections after a hearing, and household registration authorities verify proposers.
3. Joint signatures. At least 1.5 percent of the electorate within six months, on paper or through an electronic signature system.
4. Public notice and debate. Ninety days before the vote, the CEC publishes the question, reasons, government position papers, and rules for televised debates between opposing sides.
5. Vote and count. Counting and ballot validity rules from the election law apply. Eligible voters are citizens aged 18 and over.
6. Effect. If a referendum on a law passes, the law ceases to be effective on the third day after announcement; if a legislative principle initiative passes, the executive must draft a bill within three months.

The 25 percent approval quorum makes turnout strategic. Because “yes” votes must reach a quarter of all eligible voters, opponents of a proposal can sometimes do better by staying home than by voting “no,” since abstention does not add to the “yes” count. In 2021, the threshold was 4,956,367 “yes” votes;⁠⁵ in 2025, it was 5,000,523.⁠¹³

Ballots in Taiwan carry one question per ballot, which multiplies paper, screens, and counting time when questions accumulate.⁠¹⁴

Evidence: measured findings

Taiwan’s results, as reported from CEC data:

2018 rights-related questions (threshold above 4.94 million “yes”):⁠³

December 18, 2021 (threshold 4,956,367 “yes”):⁠⁵

All four 2021 questions failed on both conditions: “no” exceeded “yes,” and no “yes” total reached the threshold.⁠⁵

Logistics in 2018. Taipei voting ended at 7:46 p.m., Taoyuan at 7:29 p.m., all Taipei counting ended at 2:35 a.m., and the last national count at 2:39 a.m..⁠¹⁰

2025. Turnout of 29.53 percent and 4,341,432 “yes” votes against a 5,000,523 threshold.⁠¹³

Failures and criticisms

Taiwan’s experience drew criticism from several directions, and each is attributed here.

Administration. The 2018 delays led to the CEC chair’s resignation; a Taipei election supervisory official said referendums “must be separated from the mayoral and commissioner elections, or an electronic system adopted for referendum voting”.⁠¹⁰

Rights and majorities. The Judicial Yuan’s secretary-general said after the 2018 vote that any law following the referendums “cannot contradict” Interpretation No. 748; its president said the results would have a “legally binding effect on the administrative and legislative branches” but that rights were “already protected by the interpretation”.⁠⁸ A rights group said the results “do not alter the fact that the grand justices’ ruling must be acted on before May 24, 2019,” and accused opponents of heavy advertising spending; a supporter of question #11 said “people used their ballots to make their voice heard”.⁠³ The government then enacted the Act for Implementation of J.Y. Interpretation No. 748, promulgated May 22, 2019, which provides that “two persons of the same sex may form a permanent union” registered with household authorities.⁠¹⁵ Supporters of the referendums argued the result honored #12 (a separate law); opponents argued it honored the court. See representation and collective priorities.

Thresholds. A lawyer writing in the Taipei Times argued in 2021 that a first-stage threshold of about 1,800 proposers “went too far” and that national referendums suit poorly “minor or complex matters”.⁠¹⁶ Others criticize the approval quorum for the opposite reason: in 2025, a question favored by about 73.5 percent of participants failed.⁠¹³

Timing politics. Each calendar change has been contested along party lines. In 2025, a DPP legislator said voters in 2021 “did not want referendums coupled with national elections,” while a KMT legislator called the amendment a “lesson” for the DPP.⁠¹¹ In August 2026, the CEC chair warned that a proposal to print several questions on one ballot “could severely affect the local elections in November,” listing 11 problems including invalid votes and accessibility aids, and the KMT postponed the vote.⁠^14,17

Competing interpretations

Coupling raises participation; decoupling suppresses it. Advocates of same-day voting note that the 2018 coupled questions cleared thresholds while the decoupled 2021 and 2025 questions did not.⁠^3,5,13 On this view, separate referendum days with a turnout-sensitive quorum make passage unrealistically hard.

Coupling overloads elections and blurs issues. Opponents point to the 2018 delays and argue that referendums mixed with candidate races become partisan mobilization tools.⁠^10,11 The failure of question #19 in 2021 is cited by them as voters’ own judgment,⁠¹¹ though #19 failed on the threshold as well as the majority.⁠⁵

Referendums as rights threats versus rights as off-limits. One view holds that popular votes on minority rights are illegitimate once a constitutional court has ruled; another holds that the people may decide how a right is implemented, as long as the court’s floor is respected. Taiwan’s resolution, a separate statute satisfying the court, was criticized from both sides.⁠^3,8,15

Lessons

These are interpretations drawn from the record.

1. Thresholds are outcomes. Signature levels and approval quorums decide which questions reach voters and which can pass.⁠^1,2
2. Calendars are contested. Each party has favored the timing that suits its expected turnout.⁠¹¹
3. Administration has a ceiling. Ballot count, screens, and room size limit how many questions one day can hold.⁠^10,14
4. Courts and referendums interact. A popular vote can shape how a right is implemented without overturning it.⁠^8,15
5. Neutral wording rules matter. The 100-word, “objectively neutral” text requirement and televised debates are attempts to manage question framing.⁠¹ See question design.

Application to this framework

Taiwan’s referendums are a direct test of ideas in the My Vote Forward framework. The framework separates “My priorities” (relative importance), “My opinion” (positions on specific wording), and “My vote” (binding choices under authority). Taiwan shows how much binding votes depend on agenda rules: who can put a question on the ballot, how it is worded, when it is held, and what counts as passage (see proposals and participation over time).

The case also supports the framework’s position that collective results do not override rights. The framework treats minority rights and constitutional limits as boundaries on any aggregation of preferences (see representation). Taiwan’s sequence, in which a popular vote shaped the legal form of a right a court had already recognized, illustrates both the power and the limits of direct votes.

Unresolved questions

• What approval quorum, if any, best balances protection against low-turnout capture with the risk of strategic abstention?
• Would one-ballot, multi-question designs reduce or increase invalid votes and counting time in Taiwan’s system?
• How did the 2018 coupled referendums affect candidate races, and vice versa?
• How should referendum rules handle questions that touch rights a constitutional court has defined?
• Will the November 2026 local elections with three referendum questions repeat the 2018 delays?