Most public decisions are made by people we elect, not by the voters directly. So a framework about priorities and opinions has to answer a hard question: what should a representative do with what people say?

There is no single right answer, and people have argued about it for centuries. Should a representative follow what voters want, or use their own judgment? What if a majority wants something that would take away a minority's rights? And what if the people who speak up are not typical of everyone else?

My Vote Forward does not settle these arguments. It gives representatives clearer information, asks them to explain their reasoning, and refuses to treat any group result as an order.

Defined terms

Representative. A person or body authorized to act on behalf of others, typically through election.

Constituent. A person a representative is responsible to, usually defined by district or jurisdiction, whether or not that person participates.

Participant. A person who chose to take part in a given process. Participants are a subset of constituents, and not a random one.

Responsiveness. The degree to which a representative's actions follow constituents' expressed preferences.

Judgment. A representative's own assessment of what serves the public interest, which may differ from expressed preferences.

Minority rights. Protections that apply regardless of majority preference, usually set by constitutions, courts, and international law.

Position change. A representative's shift from one stated position to another.

Responsiveness and judgment

The classic statement of the tension comes from Edmund Burke. In his speech to the electors of Bristol on November 3, 1774, Burke said: "Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment" 1. He also argued that "Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests" 1. On this "trustee" view, a representative should consult constituents but decide for the common good.

The opposite "delegate" view holds that a representative should follow constituents' expressed wishes. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes that Hanna Pitkin, in The Concept of Representation (1967), called this "the mandate-independence controversy" and argued that both sides capture part of what representation means 2. Pitkin distinguished several views of representation: formalistic (authorization and accountability), descriptive (resemblance), symbolic, and substantive (acting in the interests of the represented) 2.

Later work broadened the picture. Jane Mansbridge, in a 2003 article, described promissory representation (judged by campaign promises), anticipatory representation (acting on what constituents will reward at the next election), gyroscopic representation (acting from one's own convictions), and surrogate representation (representing people outside one's district) 2.

The framework does not choose among these. It assumes representatives will combine responsiveness and judgment in different ways, and it aims to make both visible: what constituents and participants said, and what the representative decided and why.

Is policy responsive to the public?

Empirical research on responsiveness is contested, and the framework should not oversimplify it.

Gilens and Page, in a 2014 study of 1,779 policy issues in the United States, found that "economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts" on policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups had little or no independent influence 3. The finding has been challenged. Peter Enns argued that policy often ends up close to what middle-income Americans prefer, because different income groups often want similar things. Gilens, responding, agreed that "ordinary citizens often win the policies they want," but described them as "coincident beneficiaries rather than causes" of those outcomes 4.

The debate draws a distinction the framework relies on: getting what you want is not the same as having influence. A structured priority release can show what participants asked for. It cannot, by itself, show whether that request changed anything. Measuring influence requires separate evidence. See Evaluation.

Minority rights are not up for a vote

Some things should not be decided by majority preference, however clear.

James Madison, in Federalist No. 10 (1787), defined a faction as a number of citizens, "whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole," united by an interest "adversed to the rights of other citizens" 5. He warned that when a majority forms such a faction, popular government enables it "to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens" 5.

The U.S. Supreme Court put the principle directly in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943): "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy," and fundamental rights "may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections" 6.

Those are U.S. sources. Other countries protect rights through different constitutions, courts, and international commitments. See Jurisdictions. The principle the framework takes from them is general:

  • No group priority or opinion result is presented as a reason to limit anyone's rights.
  • Questions that would ask participants to rank or vote on others' fundamental rights are not posed. See Governance for how question review works.
  • Representatives who decline to follow a majority view on rights grounds are acting within their role, not against the framework.

Hypothetical example. A participatory priority list shows strong support for reducing services to recent arrivals in a city. A council member votes against such a proposal, explaining that it would violate equal protection commitments. The framework records her explanation alongside the priority result. It does not score her as "unresponsive."

Participants are not constituents

This is the distinction most likely to be ignored, and the most important for honest use of the framework.

People who choose to participate differ from those who do not. Pew Research Center's 2016 study of nine online opt-in samples found that all of them included more politically and civically engaged people than benchmark sources indicated, and that estimates for Hispanic and Black adults were especially inaccurate, with average bias above 10 percentage points 7. The study tested only relatively simple weighting adjustments and did not show that they removed these errors 7.

So a group result from voluntary participation describes the participants. It does not describe the district. A representative who treats it as the voice of all constituents may be overweighting the most engaged, best resourced, and best organized.

The framework's rules follow:

  • Every group result states its denominator and says it describes participants.
  • Results are never labeled as what "the district" or "the public" wants.
  • Where participation is concentrated in particular areas or groups, the release says so, within privacy limits. See Measurement and Published releases.
  • Representatives are encouraged to treat results as one input among several, alongside elections, hearings, correspondence, and representative surveys.

Explaining changed positions

Representatives change positions. Sometimes for bad reasons, often for good ones: new evidence, a changed proposal, a compromise that wins something important, or a better argument. A public culture that punishes every change as a "flip-flop" discourages learning.

The framework treats a position change as something to be explained, not hidden or penalized. A representative's explanation can be published alongside the record of the change, covering:

  1. What the earlier position was, and when.
  2. What changed: the proposal, the evidence, the constraints, or the representative's judgment.
  3. What the representative weighed, including what participants and constituents said.

This mirrors how the framework treats individual opinions, where revision is normal and dated. See Opinions.

The framework does not rate, endorse, or score candidates or officials. Publishing an explanation is not an evaluation of it.

Evidence

  • Historical texts: Burke's 1774 speech 1 and Federalist No. 10 5.
  • Legal source: Barnette (1943) on rights not subject to vote 6.
  • Scholarship (interpretation): Pitkin's and Mansbridge's accounts of representation, as summarized in a current reference work 2.
  • Research results (contested): the Gilens and Page findings and the response debate 3 4.
  • Research result: opt-in participants overrepresent the civically engaged 7.
  • Design proposal: published explanations of position changes. Untested.

Competing interpretations

Trustee. Representatives should use judgment; structured public input is useful information but should not pressure them to follow participant majorities. On this view, the framework's main value is better information.

Delegate. Representatives should follow constituents; structured input makes their wishes clearer and harder to ignore. On this view, the framework's main value is accountability.

Skeptical. Structured input mostly amplifies the already influential, because participants are unrepresentative and organized groups mobilize. On this view, the framework could worsen inequality of influence unless its safeguards work. This concern is serious and is supported by evidence on who participates 7.

Rights-first. Whatever role public input plays, it must not reach questions of fundamental rights. The framework adopts this constraint.

Application to this framework

  • Participants and constituents are named differently everywhere.
  • Group results describe participants and state their denominators.
  • No result is presented as a mandate or as the will of a district.
  • Questions about restricting others' fundamental rights are not posed for ranking or opinion.
  • Representatives may publish explanations, including of changed positions, without being rated.
  • The framework does not endorse, match, or score candidates or officials.

Unresolved questions

  • Can a participatory process recruit a broader group without becoming a survey operation? See Measurement.
  • How should representatives use participant results that conflict with a representative survey?
  • Who decides whether a proposed question touches fundamental rights, and how is that decision reviewed? See Governance.
  • Does publishing explanations of changed positions actually reduce penalties for changing one's mind? Untested.
  • How can the framework detect whether it is increasing or reducing inequality of influence? See Evaluation.

Sources

  1. Edmund Burke, "Speech to the Electors of Bristol," November 3, 1774, in The Founders' Constitution, vol. 1, ch. 13, doc. 7, University of Chicago Press. https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s7.html
  2. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Political Representation," first published January 2, 2006, substantive revision June 5, 2026. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-representation/
  3. Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, "Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens," Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 3 (September 2014): 564 to 581. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/testing-theories-of-american-politics-elites-interest-groups-and-average-citizens/62327F513959D0A304D4893B382B992B
  4. Martin Gilens, "The Insufficiency of 'Democracy by Coincidence': A Response to Peter K. Enns," Perspectives on Politics 13, no. 4 (December 2015), reprinted at Political Science Now, January 21, 2016. https://politicalsciencenow.com/the-insufficiency-of-democracy-by-coincidence-a-response-to-peter-k-enns
  5. James Madison, The Federalist No. 10, New York Packet, November 23, 1787, Avalon Project, Yale Law School. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp
  6. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/319/624
  7. Courtney Kennedy et al., "Evaluating Online Nonprobability Surveys," Pew Research Center, May 2, 2016. https://www.pewresearch.org/methods/2016/05/02/evaluating-online-nonprobability-surveys/