Is My Vote Forward an official voting service?

No. My Vote Forward is an educational framework, and its websites are not an election authority: they do not register voters, issue ballots, or cast or count official votes. The demo at demo.myvoteforward.com uses simulated data and simulated election schedules, and nothing done there is counted anywhere. The framework’s long-term ambition includes real, authorized private voting, but that would require legal authority, approvals, and independent evaluation that do not exist, and none is claimed.

The objection in its strongest form

The objection is not only “is this official?” but “will people think it is?” A website about voting, with a polished demo that shows ballots, countdowns, and confirmation screens, can be mistaken for the real thing by a hurried or less experienced user. Someone who “votes” in the demo might believe they have voted, and miss the actual election. Bad actors could screenshot the demo to suggest that an online voting service exists, or to mislead people about where and how to vote. Any confusion of that kind is a real harm to a real election.

The strongest version adds a credibility argument. Projects that describe their security in terms like encryption, passkeys, or secure hosting borrow the language of official systems. Readers who do not know how voting systems are approved may assume that a system using those tools is approved, or close to it. A framework that discusses “secure private voting” as an ambition, critics say, has a heavier duty than most to make clear that ambition is not status.

Why the objection matters

The objection matters because confusion about where to vote is a known form of election harm, whether intended or not. It also matters for the framework’s own integrity: if any page, screen, or share card implied official status, every other honest statement on the site would be undermined. And it matters for the broader debate about internet voting, where security claims have been tested by outside researchers and sometimes found wanting, as the Voatz analysis below shows.

Defined terms

• Election authority: a public body legally responsible for running elections in a jurisdiction.
• Official vote: a vote cast in an election run by a legally responsible authority.
• Certification: formal approval of voting equipment or software after testing against a standard, where a jurisdiction requires it.
• VVSG: the U.S. Election Assistance Commission’s Voluntary Voting System Guidelines.
• Demo: the demonstration at demo.myvoteforward.com, which uses simulated data and simulated election state.

Evidence

Voting system standards in the United States. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission describes the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines as “a set of specifications and requirements against which voting systems can be tested,” and states that “adhering to the VVSG is voluntary except in select states where it is required by their own state law”.⁠¹ The EAC’s Commissioners “unanimously adopted the newest VVSG standard, version 2.0” on February 10, 2021, and the EAC states that new certification applications must now be for VVSG 2.0, with limited exceptions.⁠¹ The EAC’s certification program “tests and certifies hardware and software, and may also decertify those systems,” and accredits test laboratories to perform the testing; states “are not required to participate in the program,” though some require a level of participation by law or regulation.⁠² My Vote Forward has not been tested or certified under this program or any other.

Who runs elections and decides eligibility. In the United States, eligibility to vote in federal elections requires citizenship, age 18 by Election Day, meeting state residency requirements, and registration by the state’s deadline, except in North Dakota, which does not require registration.⁠³ Each state must maintain “a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list”.⁠⁴ These are public responsibilities held by state and local authorities, not by private websites.

A cautionary case: the first internet voting app in U.S. federal elections. In 2018 West Virginia allowed select voters to cast ballots on a mobile phone through a proprietary app called Voatz.⁠⁵ A 2020 security analysis by Michael Specter, James Koppel, and Daniel Weitzner of MIT, based on reverse engineering of the app, reported that “an attacker with root access to a voter’s device can easily evade the system’s defenses,” “learn the user’s choices (even after the event is over), and alter the user’s vote,” and that “the system’s use of the blockchain is unlikely to protect against server-side attacks”.⁠⁵ This page has not reviewed any response from the company and cites the paper for its reported findings only.

Expert caution on internet voting. In 2018 the National Academies concluded that “Internet voting should not be used at the present time”.⁠⁶

How comparable systems have handled it

Switzerland: trials under federal authorization. Since 2004, 15 Swiss cantons have offered internet voting to a limited part of their electorate in over 300 trials, under the principle “security before speed”.⁠⁷ The Federal Chancellery commissions independent examinations of the system and its operation, and the cantons now in trials use Swiss Post’s system with complete verifiability.⁠⁷ In 2019 flaws discovered in the system sparked a political debate; Swiss Post halted development of a project in July 2019, and the government dropped e-voting plans for the time being.⁠⁸ Swiss practice shows what official status involves: legal authorization, limits on scale, independent examination, and the willingness to stop.

Estonia: a national identity infrastructure. Estonia’s internet voting requires a state ID-card, Mobile-ID, Smart-ID, or digital identity document with valid certificates and PIN codes, according to the State Electoral Office.⁠⁹ It rests on public infrastructure and legal authority that no private project has.

Federal guidance on electronic ballot return. CISA, the EAC, the FBI, and NIST issued joint guidance in 2020, reissued publicly in 2024, on electronic ballot delivery, marking, and return.⁠¹⁰ Verified Voting reports that the agencies rated electronic return “high-risk” even with safeguards.⁠¹¹

Competing interpretations

One interpretation holds that a private educational project should never discuss official voting as an ambition, because the ambition itself invites confusion. On this view, the framework should limit itself to priorities and opinions.

A second interpretation holds that describing requirements for authorized private voting is a legitimate research and teaching activity, as long as status is stated plainly everywhere. On this view, the framework’s job is to be more explicit about its limits than any vendor has been.

A third interpretation holds that any future official remote voting should be built by public authorities, under public law, and that private frameworks can at most contribute ideas and requirements. My Vote Forward’s own requirement that official use need legal authority and independent evaluation is consistent with this view.

What the framework answers

My Vote Forward’s rules are:

• The websites conduct no official votes, register no voters, and issue no ballots (see about and status).
• The demo ballot is labeled as simulated on every screen, and the demo has no ballot submission endpoint, no stored ballot choices, and no hidden switch to enable live voting (see private voting and security).
• No single administrator, countdown, or configuration value can enable official voting. Any official layer would be a separate, reviewed project and deployment.
• The demo never invents a registration or voting URL; it links to official sources (see identity and registration).
• Encryption, passkeys, secure hosting, or biometrics are never presented as certification or legal approval. EAC and NIST documents are cited to explain requirements, not as approvals.

Where the objection still wins

The objection’s first form keeps force. The framework cannot control screenshots of its demo or how others describe it, and labels do not stop every misunderstanding. The framework’s discussion of private voting as an ambition does carry a risk of being read as a promise. And the project has no independent evaluation of its own sites, so readers must rely on its statements about what the demo does and does not do, unless they inspect it themselves.

Unresolved questions

• What labeling and design choices best prevent a demo from being mistaken for a real ballot?
• Under what legal framework, if any, could a private initiative contribute to an official voting system?
• What independent evaluation would be needed before any pilot, and who would conduct it?
• Should the demo show ballots at all, given the risk of confusion?

Related

• Status
• About
• Private voting
• Security
• What happens when the network fails?
• Is this just a poll?
• Hard questions