Australia’s compulsory voting (1924 to present)

Australia’s compulsory voting for federal elections dates from a 1924 amendment to the Commonwealth Electoral Act, which the Australian Electoral Commission says was intended to “increase voter turnout and reduce party campaign expenditure”; House of Representatives turnout rose from 59.38% in 1922 to 91.38% in 1925. Enrolment has been compulsory since 1912, and an elector who does not vote without a “valid and sufficient reason” faces a $20 administrative penalty, with prosecution possible if it is not paid. In 2025, turnout was 90.70% nationally but 70.83% in the Northern Territory, and 5.60% of House votes were informal.

In Australia, people who are eligible must enroll to vote, and enrolled voters must vote in federal elections. If you do not vote and do not have a good reason, you get a letter and can pay a small fine. Almost everyone votes as a result, about nine in ten enrolled people. Researchers have found that making everyone vote changed which parties won and what governments spent money on. Critics say people should be free not to vote, and that some people who are forced to vote spoil their ballots or vote without much thought.

For the Australian origins of the secret ballot, see the secret ballot. For problems of unequal participation more generally, see measurement and comparative cases.

Defined terms

Australia’s compulsory voting system uses several specific terms.

• Compulsory enrolment: the legal duty to be on the electoral roll. The AEC states the Electoral Act was amended in 1912 to make enrolment compulsory.⁠¹
• Compulsory voting: the legal duty for an enrolled elector to vote at a federal election, introduced by amendment in 1924.⁠^1,2 In practice it is a duty to attend and mark a ballot; ballot secrecy means no one can verify whether a ballot was filled in validly.
• Valid and sufficient reason: the legal excuse for not voting under the Electoral Act, assessed case by case by the Divisional Returning Officer guided by court decisions.⁠¹
• Apparent non-voter: an enrolled elector recorded as not having voted, to whom a penalty notice is sent.⁠¹
• Turnout (AEC definition): the sum of formal and informal votes divided by final enrolment.⁠³ The denominator is enrolled electors, not all eligible adults.
• Informal vote: a ballot that is counted in turnout but not counted for any candidate.⁠^3,5

What happened

Australia’s compulsory voting developed in stages documented by the AEC.

• 1912. The Electoral Act was amended to make enrolment compulsory.⁠¹
• 1922. House of Representatives turnout was 59.38%.⁠³
• 1924. The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 was amended to make voting at federal elections compulsory, with the stated aims “to increase voter turnout and reduce party campaign expenditure”.⁠¹ The AEC’s history notes the change was made “to improve the low rates of voter turnout”.⁠²
• 1925. House turnout was 91.38%;⁠³ the AEC describes “a dramatic increase in voter turnout at the following election”.⁠²
• 1926. In Judd v McKeon, the High Court held that a voter’s objection to the social order and his party’s position was not a valid and sufficient reason, and gave examples of valid reasons such as physical obstruction, illness, accident, or diversion to save life or assist in a disaster.⁠¹
• 1970 to 2018. Further cases held that having no preference among candidates (Lubcke v Little, 1970), objecting to all candidates (Krosch v Springell, 1974), lacking time to research candidates (O’Brien v Warden, 1981), and conscientious objection to voting (CDPP v Easton, 2018) were not valid reasons.⁠¹
• 2022 and 2025. Federal elections with turnout of 89.82% and 90.70%.⁠^4,6

How it worked

Australia’s compulsory voting relies on enrolment rules, a low administrative penalty, and broad but defined exceptions.

The duty. Failing to vote without a valid and sufficient reason is an offence under subsection 245(15) of the Electoral Act.⁠¹ A genuine religious duty to abstain is a valid reason under subsection 245(14).⁠¹

Enforcement. After each election, the Electoral Commissioner prepares lists of apparent non-voters, and Divisional Returning Officers send penalty notices within three months.⁠¹ A recipient can show they voted, give a valid and sufficient reason, or pay a $20 administrative penalty, which ends the matter.⁠¹ If there is no reply, a second notice follows; if the penalty is unpaid and no satisfactory reason is given, the elector may be prosecuted, and a court may impose a fine of one penalty unit plus costs.⁠¹

Neutral administrator. The AEC states it takes no position on whether voting should be compulsory, which it treats as a matter for Parliament.⁠¹

Enrolment. As of September 30, 2026, the AEC reports 18,470,795 electors enrolled out of an estimated eligible population of 18,883,766, a national enrolment rate of 97.8%.⁠⁷ Turnout is measured against enrolment,⁠³ so unenrolled eligible people do not appear in the turnout figure.

Why the mechanism matters. The penalty is small and the exceptions are real, so compliance depends heavily on norm and habit as well as on enforcement. Ballot secrecy means the law can require attendance but cannot require a valid choice.

Evidence: measured results

Australia’s compulsory voting can be measured through turnout, informal voting, enrolment and research on its effects.

Turnout over time:⁠^3,4,6

Regional gaps. In 2022, Northern Territory turnout was 73.08%, the lowest of any state or territory, against 92.43% in Tasmania.⁠⁴ In 2025 it was 70.83%.⁠⁶

Indigenous enrolment. The AEC estimates the Indigenous enrolment rate at 93.8% as of June 30, 2026 (634,407 of an estimated 676,690 Indigenous voting-age people), with rates of 87.0% in the Northern Territory and 87.5% in Western Australia.⁠⁸ The national enrolment rate for all electors was 97.8% at September 30, 2026.⁠⁷

Informal voting. In 2022, 802,337 House votes (5.19%) were informal, ranging from 2.46% in the Australian Capital Territory to 6.22% in New South Wales.⁠⁵ In 2025, 919,512 House votes (5.60%) were informal.⁠⁹ Informal votes include both deliberate and accidental ones; these totals do not distinguish them.

Effects on outcomes and policy. Anthony Fowler, in the Quarterly Journal of Political Science (2013), uses the fact that Australian states adopted compulsory voting at different times and estimates that it raised turnout by about 24 percentage points, which increased the Labor Party’s vote and seat shares by 7 to 10 percentage points; a cross-national comparison also links Australia’s adoption to higher pension spending.⁠¹⁰ He reports that before compulsory voting, wealthier citizens voted at much higher rates than working-class citizens.⁠¹⁰ These are estimates from historical data in a particular era and party system.

The comparative argument. Arend Lijphart, in his 1996 American Political Science Association presidential address, argued that unequal turnout produces unequal influence, that turnout is systematically lower among the less well-off, and that compulsory voting can maximize turnout on its own; he concluded its advantages “far outweigh the normative and practical objections to it”.⁠¹¹

Failures and criticisms

Australia’s compulsory voting has critics and defenders, and the strongest arguments on each side are set out here.

Liberty. Critics argue that voting is a right, and a right includes the right not to exercise it. The case law shows people pressing versions of this argument: objection to the social order (Judd), no preference among candidates (Lubcke), objection to all candidates (Krosch), and conscientious objection (Easton); courts rejected each as a legal excuse.⁠¹ Defenders reply that the duty is to attend, the penalty is $20, and a voter may cast a blank or spoiled ballot privately.

Quality of votes. Critics argue compulsion adds voters who know little about the choice, and point to informal voting above 5%.⁠^5,9 One appeal court overturned a magistrate who had accepted lack of time to research candidates as an excuse,⁠¹ which critics cite as evidence that the system requires votes from people who say they are unprepared. Defenders reply that voluntary systems also include uninformed voters, and that informal votes are a small share and partly accidental.

Partisan effects. Fowler’s finding that compulsory voting raised Labor’s vote share,⁠¹⁰ is read differently depending on one’s view: supporters see it as correcting the underrepresentation of working-class voters; skeptics see it as evidence that the rule is not neutral among parties. The finding itself concerns the period of adoption, not necessarily today.

Persistent gaps. Compulsory voting has not produced uniform participation. Northern Territory turnout was more than 19 points below the national figure in 2025⁠⁶ and Indigenous enrolment remains below the national rate, especially in the Northern Territory and Western Australia.⁠^7,8 Critics from different directions use this: some argue penalties fall on people facing the most barriers; others argue enforcement is uneven.

Purpose. One of the 1924 aims was to “reduce party campaign expenditure”.⁠¹ Whether that aim was met is not established by the sources consulted here.

Competing interpretations

Scholars and citizens interpret Australia’s experience in at least three ways.

A model for equal participation. On this reading, following Lijphart,⁠¹¹ and Fowler⁠¹⁰ compulsory voting reduces class bias in who votes and so produces governments more responsive to the whole population.

A civic duty with costs. On this reading, the system is defensible because the penalty is small and the exceptions are real, but it should be judged by informal voting, regional gaps and enforcement fairness, not by headline turnout alone.⁠^4,5,8

An infringement on freedom. On this reading, a democracy should not penalize abstention, and high turnout obtained by compulsion is not evidence of engagement. The courts’ rejection of conscientious objection,⁠¹ is, on this view, the clearest statement of what the system costs.

What transferred and what did not

Australia’s compulsory voting is often cited abroad, but the system depends on features that do not always travel.

Transferred. The idea is used in other democracies; Chile, for example, made voting mandatory in its 2022 constitutional plebiscite⁠¹² and Chile’s experience shows how much compulsion can change the electorate; see Chile’s constitutional processes.

Depends on context. Australia pairs compulsory voting with compulsory enrolment,⁠¹ a national independent electoral commission, and a small, consistently enforced administrative penalty. Without those, compulsion may produce little change or uneven enforcement. This is an interpretation, not a measured result.

Not established. Whether compulsory voting increases political knowledge or engagement between elections was not established by sources verified for this page.

Application to this framework

Australia’s compulsory voting informs several design principles in My Vote Forward.

• Denominators matter. The AEC measures turnout against enrolment,⁠³ so 90% turnout can coexist with unenrolled eligible people. The framework asks every release to state its population; see measurement.
• Participation differs by place. Regional gaps⁠^4,6,8 show why averages hide groups; see published releases.
• Attendance is not choice. Compulsion can require a ballot but not a preference, which is one reason the framework keeps priorities, opinions and private voting separate.
• Secrecy protects abstention within compulsion. Because the ballot is secret, a compelled voter can still decline to choose. See the secret ballot and intimidation.
• Voluntary participation is a design fact. My Vote Forward’s own participation is voluntary. Fowler’s and Lijphart’s findings⁠^10,11 are a warning that voluntary participants may differ from the population; see what if most people never participate.

Unresolved questions

• How much of Australia’s informal vote is deliberate protest and how much is error, and does the share differ by community?
• Why do Northern Territory turnout and Indigenous enrolment remain lower, and which measures would close the gap?
• Do Fowler’s estimates of partisan and policy effects hold in today’s party system?
• Did compulsory voting reduce party campaign spending, one of its original aims?
• Does compulsory voting change political knowledge, trust, or engagement between elections?